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Judicial independence, accountability, and reform

analysis 2008-02-04 | Fb Sharing

Judicial independence, accountability, and reform.

This study, compiled by the Eötvös Károly Institute on behalf of the National Council of Justice (OIT), examines ways to reconcile two principles that may seem mutually exclusive: the independence of the judiciary from other branches of power, and the constitutional democratic doctrine of accountability of all forms of power, including the judicial.

The solution is to bring about conditions that will guarantee the simultaneous vindication of both of these tenets.

The study offers an overview of the history of judicial reform in Hungary, a discussion of other court administration systems elsewhere in Europe that could serve as a model, and a scrutiny of the status quo in Hungarian judicial administration.

We have found that there is a great need and plenty of room to improve the level of accountability, both individual and organizational, within the Hungarian court system.

In order to strengthen external control without lending more control and influence to the other branches of power, we are in favor of passing new legislation revising the OIT’s personnel composition, rules of voting, and disclosure obligations. Therefore, we urge the drafting and adoption of an Act on Judicial Information.

The study also addresses such issues as the distribution ofresources, financial management, and the procedures of electing judges,providing them with ongoing training, and assessing their workperformance.

Download the study form our Hungarian site.

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